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Can Police Use Google Location Data to Identify You in Texas?

  • 5 days ago
  • 8 min read

How Geofence Warrants Work—and What the Supreme Court’s New Decision Means for Your Privacy


When a crime occurs, police may not know the identity of the person responsible.

But they may know that the person was carrying a cellphone.


Instead of searching for a known suspect, investigators can use a geofence warrant to request information about devices located near the crime scene during a specific period of time.


That request may include information belonging to people who were never suspected of committing a crime.


On June 29, 2026, the United States Supreme Court addressed this practice in Chatrie v. United States. The Court held that when police obtain a person’s cellphone location data from Google, they conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment.


The ruling provides important new protections for digital privacy. But it does not mean that every geofence warrant is automatically unconstitutional.


Google location data can reveal where you’ve been—but when and how Texas police can access it depends on evolving Fourth Amendment protections.
Google location data can reveal where you’ve been—but when and how Texas police can access it depends on evolving Fourth Amendment protections.

What Is a Geofence Warrant?


A traditional search warrant usually targets a known person, address, account, or device.

A geofence warrant works differently.


Police identify a geographic area and a specific period of time. They then ask a technology company to search its records for devices that appeared inside that digital boundary.


For example, investigators may request information about every device detected:

  • Within a certain distance of a business

  • During the hour surrounding a robbery

  • Near a possible entry or escape route

  • Around the location of a shooting or other serious crime


The initial information may be provided without identifying the device owners.

Investigators can then narrow the results and request names, email addresses, account information, or other identifying details connected to selected devices.


This means police may begin their search without knowing who they are looking for.


Can Innocent People Be Included in a Geofence Search?


Yes.


A person may appear within a geofence because they:

  • Live near the location

  • Work at a nearby business

  • Drove through the area

  • Visited a neighboring property

  • Attended a nearby church

  • Walked past the location

  • Made a delivery in the area


Being included in the results does not establish that someone entered the crime scene or participated in a crime.


Cellphone location information may also be incomplete or imprecise. A device’s estimated location does not always prove exactly where the user was standing.

The person carrying the phone may not even be the registered account holder.

Location data may provide investigators with a lead. It should not automatically be treated as proof of criminal conduct.


What Happened in Chatrie v. United States?


The case began after an armed robbery at a credit union in Virginia.


Investigators did not know the robber’s identity. Police obtained a geofence warrant directing Google to provide information about devices located near the credit union around the time of the robbery.


The geographic area included more than the credit union. It also covered nearby homes, businesses, and a church.


Google initially identified multiple devices within the geofence. Through a multi-step process, investigators narrowed the list and obtained identifying information for three users.


One of them was Okello Chatrie.


The location data showed that Chatrie’s device had been near the credit union. Police used that information as part of the investigation that eventually led to his arrest.

Chatrie challenged the search, arguing that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they obtained his location history from Google.


What Did the Supreme Court Decide?


The Supreme Court held that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they obtained Chatrie’s cellphone location data.


The Court concluded that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in information showing the location of their cellphones.


That protection applies even when the information:

  • Is stored by a technology company

  • Covers a relatively short period of time

  • Was generated while the person was in public

  • Was collected through an optional location-history service


The government argued that Chatrie had shared his information with Google and therefore gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy.


The Supreme Court rejected that broad argument.


The fact that a technology company stores personal information does not automatically give the government unrestricted access to it.


Why Is Location Data Protected?


Cellphone location information can reveal much more than a single point on a map.


It may show:

  • Where someone lives and works

  • Which medical offices they visit

  • Where they worship

  • Which political events they attend

  • Who they regularly visit

  • When they leave or return home

  • Their daily routines and travel patterns


Modern cellphones generate large amounts of personal information as people go about their daily lives.


Location data can allow the government to reconstruct a person’s movements without physically following them.


The Supreme Court recognized that this type of digital surveillance can reveal private associations and activities protected by the Constitution.


Did the Supreme Court Ban Geofence Warrants?


No.


The Court decided that obtaining cellphone location data is a search under the Fourth Amendment.


It did not decide that every geofence warrant is automatically invalid.


The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit every search. It prohibits unreasonable searches and generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause.


A warrant must also describe with sufficient particularity what the government is authorized to search or seize.


Whether a geofence warrant satisfies those requirements may depend on:

  • The size of the geographic boundary

  • The length of the requested time period

  • The number of devices included

  • The type of location information requested

  • Whether the area contains homes, businesses, churches, or medical offices

  • How police narrow the original list of devices

  • Whether officers have too much discretion to select users for identification

  • Whether probable cause exists for the people whose information is searched


The Supreme Court did not decide whether the particular warrant used in Chatrie’s case was reasonable.


That issue was left for the lower courts to consider.


Police can still obtain cellphone location data, but the legal requirements depend on the type of information requested and how it will be used.
Police can still obtain cellphone location data, but the legal requirements depend on the type of information requested and how it will be used.

Can Police Still Obtain Your Location Information?


Yes—but the government must comply with the Fourth Amendment.


Depending on the circumstances, police may seek location information through:

  • A warrant targeting a known person or device

  • Records maintained by a cellphone provider

  • Location information stored by an application

  • Real-time tracking authorized by a court

  • Information voluntarily provided by the user

  • An emergency request involving an immediate threat to life or safety


Different legal requirements may apply depending on the type of information requested and how the government intends to use it.


A warrant targeting a known suspect is also different from a geofence warrant that begins by searching information connected to multiple unidentified people.


The Chatrie decision does not prevent legitimate digital investigations. It requires courts to recognize that obtaining cellphone location data implicates the Fourth Amendment.


What Does the Decision Mean in Texas?


Because Chatrie v. United States is a United States Supreme Court decision, it applies to law enforcement investigations throughout Texas.


Texas police departments, sheriff’s offices, and state agencies cannot treat cellphone location information as unprotected simply because it is stored by Google or another technology company.


However, the decision does not mean that every person identified through a geofence warrant automatically has a civil-rights claim.


Courts may still need to determine:

  • Whether the warrant was supported by probable cause

  • Whether the warrant was sufficiently specific

  • Whether police exceeded the warrant’s limits

  • Whether an emergency exception applied

  • Whether officers relied on the warrant in good faith

  • Whether the search led to a detention, arrest, or prosecution

  • Whether qualified immunity applies to a civil claim


The actual warrant and the steps investigators used to identify a particular person will be important.


What Should You Do If Police Used Location Data to Identify You?


If you learn that police obtained your cellphone location information:


Ask Whether Police Have a Warrant

You may not receive a copy immediately, especially during an active investigation.

However, the existence and wording of the warrant matter. The warrant should identify what information police were authorized to obtain and the limits placed on the search.


Do Not Consent to Additional Searches

Police may ask to search your phone, download its contents, or access your online accounts.

You may clearly state that you do not consent to a search.

Do not physically interfere with an officer. But do not assume that you must unlock or hand over your device simply because an officer asks you to do so.


Preserve Account Notifications

Save any email, letter, account notification, or other communication indicating that your information was requested or disclosed.

Do not delete location history, messages, photographs, receipts, or other records that may help establish where you were and why you were there.


Document the Police Encounter

Write down:

  • When officers contacted you

  • What they said about your location

  • Whether they displayed a warrant

  • Whether you were free to leave

  • Whether they took your phone

  • Whether they asked you to unlock it

  • Whether you gave permission to search

  • Whether you were detained or arrested


Small details can become important when determining whether an additional search or seizure occurred.


Speak With an Attorney Before Giving a Detailed Statement

Do not assume that an informal conversation with investigators is harmless.

An attorney may be able to determine whether police had a valid warrant, whether they exceeded its scope, and whether the location information was used to justify another search, detention, or arrest.


Request More Than the Location Data


Location information rarely tells the entire story.


The data may not establish:

  • Who was carrying the device

  • Why the device was in the area

  • Whether the person entered a particular building

  • How accurate the estimated location was

  • Whether the device remained in the area

  • Whether investigators interpreted the information correctly


When evaluating a geofence search, relevant evidence may include:

  • The geofence warrant

  • The supporting affidavit

  • The court order approving the request

  • Maps showing the geographic boundary

  • The time period covered by the warrant

  • Records returned by the technology company

  • Communications between police and the company

  • Reports explaining how investigators narrowed the results

  • Surveillance video

  • License-plate-reader records

  • Cellphone-provider records

  • Police reports

  • Interview recordings

  • Evidence showing why the person was in the area


The location information should be compared with the complete investigation.

A point on a digital map should not be evaluated in isolation.


Why Location Data Matters in a Civil-Rights Case


Cellphone location information may become important evidence in claims involving:

  • Unreasonable searches

  • Unlawful detention

  • False arrest

  • Improper seizure of a cellphone

  • Searches exceeding the scope of a warrant

  • False or misleading warrant applications

  • First Amendment retaliation

  • Unconstitutional law enforcement policies


But an improper search does not automatically establish civil liability.


A civil-rights claim may depend on which official conducted or authorized the search, whether clearly established law was violated, whether qualified immunity applies, and what injury resulted from the search.


The warrant, provider records, police reports, and investigative timeline should be evaluated together.


The legal analysis depends on the complete circumstances.


The Bottom Line


Police may use location information as part of a criminal investigation—but obtaining that information from a technology company is a Fourth Amendment search.


Under Chatrie v. United States, cellphone location data does not lose constitutional protection simply because it is stored by Google or another third party.


The decision does not prohibit every geofence warrant. Courts must still determine whether a particular warrant was supported by probable cause, sufficiently specific, and reasonably limited.


If police used location data to identify, detain, search, or arrest you, preserve every notice and record connected to the search. The wording of the warrant and the way investigators narrowed the information may be critical.


Contact a Texas Civil Rights Attorney


If police obtained your cellphone location data, searched your device, or used digital information to detain or arrest you, early legal review can be critical.


Grable PLLC represents individuals in civil rights and constitutional cases involving unlawful searches, seizures, arrests, and government misconduct throughout Texas.

Contact the firm to discuss what happened and whether your Fourth Amendment rights were violated.


210-963-5297

 
 
 

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